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bank based on Scottish banking principles and a trusted local bank of the people of Hong Kong. It was 
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Accounting practices of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank from 1865 to 1876 fostered its 
repertoire of precocial identities.  Hongkong and Shanghai bank used these identities 
to act opportunistically in commercial dealings with the British colonial 
administration of Hong Kong, the public of the United Kingdom, and the Emperor of 
China and his Chinese administration.  This paper argues HSBC varied its financial 
reporting practices to manage its identities in public spaces in different cultural 
constituencies in order to ensure its longer term survival. The approach taken is to use 
the example of HSBC’s Foochow loan to demonstrate its use of financial reporting to 
sustain its various identities.  Documents pertaining to the published financial 
statements of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank between 1865 and 1876 are examined for 
the accounting practices and policies used.  Secondary sources were also analysed.  
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank uniquely positioned itself to be simultaneously viewed 
as a conservative bank based on Scottish banking principles and a trusted local bank 
of the people of Hong Kong. It was the only bank acting in these three capacities. It 
achieved this by varying financial reporting practices to manage stakeholders’ 
confidence.  Only sources written in English were utilised in this study, as English 
texts dominate the historical records.  However Chinese language representations are 
not present in this analysis.  This study challenges meta-narrative explanations of the 
banking sector in colonization.      
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HSBC, the then Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, is a global bank with strong 
historical roots.  Its viability as a trusted financial institution has depended upon its 
successful projection of images to satisfy both Eastern and Western cultures.  It has 
been dually registered in both Hong Kong and London since its foundation.  This 
paper demonstrates the longstanding proactive nature of financial reporting in creating 
diverse culturally acceptable images. Through the examination of a financial event the 
“Foochow Loan” from 1874 to 1876, the Orient’s place in the development of 
Western financial practices in Hong Kong is acknowledged, and the construction of 
identities is explored.  Documents pertaining to the published financial statements of 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank between 1865 and 1876 are examined for the 
accounting practices and policies used.  Secondary sources were also analysed.   
 
An overview of Scottish banking and financial principles and reporting practices 
are first described.  The second section examines the circumstances of how these were 
applied by Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Hong Kong during the period 1865 to 
1874. The events of the Foochow loan are then examined to critically evaluate the 
cultural complexities ensuing.  The discussion section demonstrates the Hongkong 
and Shanghai Bank’s use of different identities during this period to convey financial 
stability across East and West cultures. A conclusion is then offered, arguing its’ 
banking and reporting principles and practices reflected the Occident – Orient divide, 
and in doing so HSBC needed to construct and project a contrasting image or idea of 
their invention to survive.   
  
2. Scottish banking and financial principles and reporting practices 
 
The formation of groups of professional accountants began in Scotland during 
the 1850s and in England from the 1870s (Mathews and Perera, 1996).  At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, accounting practices were unsystematic, with a 
variety of asset valuation methods and approaches to calculations of profits (Gordon 
and Gary, 1994).  There was no requirement to conform to a uniform format of 
financial reporting (Brief, 1966; Edwards, 1980; Kedslie, 1990; Lee, 1979; Parker, 
1991). The Scots were pioneers in developing conservative banking principles of the 
acceptance of deposits and the paying of interest.  Traditional Scottish banking at this 
time paid the same interest on both fixed and current deposit accounts.    
 
Scottish banking principles included joint stock, issue of bank notes, branching 
system, interest on current accounts, and lending on basis of cash credit (Munn, 
1982).  It was a tradition for Scottish financial institutions to issue bank notes during 
the 17th and 18th centuries.   The first notes were issued by the Bank of Scotland in 
1695.  The issue of nites was vital to the success of banks which depended on the 
ability of banks to put their notes into circulation.   
 
One of the influences of the Scottish Principle that can be seen in the financial 
statements was the introduction of cash credit.  It was the forerunner of the modern 
overdraft.    Cash credit accounts closely resembled what is today known as a line of 
credit.  They were a popular lending device which offered advances to their customers 
and helped attract new customers.  The bank introduced the “Discount, Loans, & 
Credits” accounts in its Statement of Liabilities and Assets in 1865.  The British 
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Banking system of the nineteenth century concentrated chiefly on the provision of 
short-term loans for the purposes of working capital rather than long-term loans for 
fixed capital investment (Boyns et al., 1997, 53).  Therefore, this item was placed 
under cash balances on hand.  However, it did not include any provision for bad debts.  
The bank had from time to time written off losses or made allowances for bad or 
doubtful debts before stating net profits.  From the financial statements, these loans 
and credit were mainly financed by deposits.  Therefore, a sound financial image was 
important to its ability to attract depositors and survive. 
 
Apart from the cash credit accounts, the bank also had a “Branches and 
Agencies” account in the first year two years following the foundation of the bank in 
1865.  Establishing branches countrywide which provided accessible banking services 
to customers was another of the Scottish Principles that was influenced by the founder 
of the bank, the then Thomas Sutherland.   
 
 
3. Historical Context of Banking in Hong Kong: HSBC 1865-1874. 
 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank was established in 1865 by Sir Thomas 
Sutherland, just two and a half decades after the first moves to form a group of 
professional accountants  in Scotland during the 1850s, and before such professional 
accounting groups were being formed in England from the 1870s onwards (Mathew 
and Perera, 1996).  It was listed in both London and Hong Kong. During that period 
Hong Kong did not have its own Banking Ordinance or accounting regulations.  Most 
of the organizations just followed what had been done in England (King and 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1987).  The bank retained the 
traditions of a British overseas bank.  It was incorporated under the Colonial Banking 
Regulations of 1840, and reflected Scottish banking principles, and was formed as a 
joint stock company under the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. It issued its own of 
bank notes, paid interest on current accounts, and lent on the basis of cash credit 
(Munn 1982).   
 
The Joint Stock companies Act 1856 provided a standard form of balance sheet 
for the guidance of company directors and accountants (Chatfield, 1997, Chatfield and 
Vangermeerch, 1996). The HSBC’s first balance sheet, at 31 December 1865, was 
made available to shareholders on 12 February 1866 but does not appear to have been 
more widely published and an example of this is reproduced in Figure 1.  It illustrates 
the way in which the Bank accounted for its financial position and makes evident the 
reliance on auditors to monitor financial affairs, which was not required by any 
regulations and so was a legitimizing strategy.  As shown in Figure 1, the balance 
sheet was a simple statement prepared for the general meeting of shareholders. The 
balance sheet simply listed all assets in order of realisability and liabilities in order of 
repayment priority. Therefore there were no classifications and no corresponding 
period figures.  Furthermore there were “no detailed notes to the accounts although 
the reserve fund was disclosed to be a separate statement from 1867 onwards” (Lee, 
1983, 83).  The format of the balance sheet in 1865, with assets on the right, equities 
on the left and permanent capital at the top, is a distinctive feature of the British 
balance sheet (Littleton and Zimmerman, 1962). HSBC financial reporting were 




Take in Figure 1 
 
During the early years, the bank had limited accounting and disclosure of 
information in its financial statements due to generally accepted bank accounting 
practice minimal legal requirements.  HSBC was subject to the diminishing scope of 
British imperial banking policy due to the continued economic independence of its 
Eastern constituents and its policy of retaining a significant percentage of its shares on 
the Eastern registers.  Hongkong and Shanghai Bank was incorporated with its own 
special ordinances1 authorised by the Treasury in Hong Kong.  The special ordinances 
mainly focused on limited liability issues and the note issues.  They did not state a 
disclosure requirement.  Therefore the bank’s accounts “have never been made public, 
they have always been audited” (King, 1987, 35).  The special ordinances stated that 
the bank was required to audit its accounts yearly.  As shown in Figure 1, the annual 
report in 1866 was audited by two individuals, Rennie W.H. (the Colonial Auditor 
General) and Smith C.T.  They stated in the report that they have examined and 
audited the accounts and found them correct.  Financial reports were later become 
more informative, however they were being prepared in the context of an absence of 
legal and professional requirements for accounting measurement and disclosure. 
 
The semi-annual accounts were not a statement of the position of the bank on 
the date stated, because various branches of the bank closed their books on different 
days to enable the information to reach Head Office.  The auditors were concerned 
mostly about the dates at which these accounts were recorded, the time lag involved in 
their integration with the Head office accounts, the judgement of the status of non-
performing loans, and the valuation of publicly quoted securities, a “routine 
verification” process (Chatfield, 1977, 120).   
   
Lee (1983, 83) commented that “the profit statement was merely a report of 
recommended appropriations of figures, the balance sheet having been prepared 
excluding these appropriations”.   For the profit and loss account, expenses included 
dividends, amounts carried to the reserve fund, amounts written off for preliminary 
expenses, any bonus to constituents and depositors, and rebates on Bills not due.  
Moreover, the Scots were the pioneers in developing the acceptance of deposits and 
the paying of interest.  Traditional Scottish banking paid the same interest on both 
fixed and current deposit account.  Hongkong and Shanghai Bank on the other hand, 
paid 3% for 3 months, 5% for 6 months, and 6% for 12 months on fixed deposit and 
2% on current deposit (King and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 
1987). The bank deducted all the expenses and interest paid from the Gross profit.  
However, the bank did not disclose the detail of the expenses on the profit and loss 
account for the year end.  The audience of the reports at this stage were more the 
Occident rather than the Orient.   
 
The provisional committee was formed comprising 15 members, including Sir 
Thomas Sutherland and all the leading firms in Hong Kong except Jardine and 
Matheson.  The composition of the committee reflected the international nature of the 
merchants of the Treaty Ports.  It included British, American, German, Danish, Jewish 
                                                 
1 The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Ordinance (No. 5 of 1866).  It was modelled after the charter of 
the Asiatic Banking Corporation but with exceptions appropriate for Hong Kong. 
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and Indian members.  Most of them belonged to the firms established originally in 
Hong Kong (King and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1987).  
However, no local Chinese participated in the formation of the bank.  It may due to 
cultural differences and language barriers (Cheng, 1969). 
 
The financial event of the Foochow loan is described, followed by an analysis of 
its associated transactions from the perspectives of the principles and conventions of 
the Scottish and British, contrasted with those of local Chinese perceptions 
 
4. Foochow Loan (1874 – 1895) 
 
Foochow is a province in mainland China. The Foochow loan occurred 
because of the pre-existing business relationship between the Chinese Superintendent 
of Trade for the North (Li Hung-chang2) who was located in the Peking Province, and 
the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Chief Manager James Grieg3 who was located in 
Hongkong.  Li Hung-chang’s office entitled both he and James Grieg access to the 
Emperor Mu-tsung (King 1983, King and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation 1987).  Hongkong and Shanghai Bank negotiated a written agreement 
and in October 1874 committed to loan the Office of the Emperor in Peking a sum of 
£627,615. The contract was signed in two stages, the first tranche of the loan 
£539,748 was issued on 28 November 1874, while the second tranche was issued on 5 
June 1875.  The loan was made to “His Majesty Tung Chih, Emperor of China”, 
which was a reign title (King and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 
1987).  The Foochow loan was recorded in the written contract for the sum of 2 
million taels, at an agreed but arbitrary exchange rate for silver.  However, when 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank came to record the transaction in their records they 
converted the 2 million taels into British pounds using a floating exchange rate of 
gold based pound sterling.  This meant that while the loan was recorded as the 
equivalent of 2 million taels in gold, the Chinese repaid correctly according to their 
contract the equivalent of 2 million taels in silver.  Profit earned then was exposed to 
the fluctuation of the exchange rates. While the loan did attract interest, there was no 
fixed interest rate attached. It was in the terms of the contract that the loan was repaid 
monthly.  There was no collateral required for the Foochow loan.  It was regarded as a 
security because it was under the seal of the Emperor.   
 
Upon signing the contract, the bank advanced 60,000 Taels immediately to the 
Chinese government.  At the time, the bank did not have sufficient funds in their Cash 
Account to cover this advance, and so recorded the transaction against the Reserve 
Fund.  For HSBC the purpose of the Reserve Fund is specifically stated for the 
equalization of dividends under the Acts of 1857 and 1858 (Article 122 of the deed of 
settlement). This urgent advance, while part of the total negotiated amount of 2 
million taels, was not included in the terms of the contract with respect to its timing.  
This transgression may have been due to pressure from the Chinese government for 
immediate funds (Born, 1983; King, 1983; King and Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation, 1987; Liu, 1979).  The full amount of the loan to the Chinese 
                                                 
2 Li Hung-chang was a leading statesman of the late Qing Dynasty and a Chinese general who ended 
many major rebellions (Liu, 1970). 
3 James Grieg was the chief manager of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in 1871.  He was forced to 
resign in 1876 because of the criticism from the bank and public from the accounting procedures of 
Foochow Loan (King and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. 1987). 
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authorities was made on 19 December 1874.  The total account was included in the 
December 1874 accounts under “discounts, loans and credits”.  The contract was 
signed on the 28 November 1874, the first tranche amount was made available to the 
Chinese on the 19 December 1874.  The total amount was included in the December 
1874 accounts of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation under “discounts, 
loans and credits”.  There is no record of the amount of the advance being reversed 
out of the Reserve Fund at a later date.  This led to concern among the shareholders 
and a call for independent inspection of the bank’s accounts (King and Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1983).   
 
In order to finance the Foochow loan, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank issued in 
their name in June 1875, six months after the first advance of the loan, a public loan 
(bond issue) on behalf of the Emperor and his government to fund the loan. These 
bonds with an interest rate of 8% fixed were sold in Hongkong and Shanghai (King 
and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1987).  There was no guarantee at 
the time that the public issue would be taken up. While the term of the loan was 20 
years, the term of the bonds was only 10 years.   
 
The bank recorded upfront in the profit and loss account at the end of 1874 a 
high proportion of the total profits on the loan, which they calculated to be 
approximately HK$125,000. This profit was recognised but not realized.  This 
incident caused the shareholders to raise questions about the profitability of the loan 
and the accountability of the bank.  The Foochow loan was eventually repaid in full, 
but not all the repayments were made on schedule.  
 
The Foochow loan was noteworthy because it was not typical of contemporary 
lending practice. Examination of the events of the Foochow loan reveals the 
complexities that Hongkong and Shanghai Bank faced in operating in an eastern 
environment using western business conventions.  In reconciling the two, this paper 
argues that the bank fostered dual of identities.  HSBC used these opportunistically in 
commercial dealings with the British colonial administration of Hong Kong, the 
public of the United Kingdom, and the Emperor of China and his government. The 
next sections juxtapose two discerned identities used by Hongkong and Shanghai 
bank over the course of the Foochow loan, a Scottish and British identity, and a 
British Colonial Hong Kong identity.   
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Hongkong and Shanghai Bank’s Scottish and British identity 
 
Any founder has a great impact on the structure and accounting practices of 
the organization he or she establishes.  Their characteristics and practices often 
become institutionalized in the organization’s culture.  This can clearly be seen from 
HSBC’s founder, Sir Thomas Sutherland.  His Scottish background and experience as 
the Hong Kong agent for the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
(P&O) had an impact on the bank’s operation and financial practices (Napier, 1989).  
He realized that to be successful, a local bank would have to meet the diverse needs of 
the community and lure constituents from rival firms4.  He believed that there was a 
                                                 
4 The traditional rivalry between Jardine, Matheson and Co. and Dent and Co., between Russell and 
Co., and Augustine Heard and Co. 
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role for a locally based bank in Hong Kong, which could help to finance trade in East 
Asia and provide banking services to the local community.   
 
Sutherland promoted Hongkong and Shanghai Bank as a bank to be operated 
on ‘Scottish banking principles’5, suggesting to stakeholders that the model for his 
bank would be banks such as the Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
both of which were over 150 years old in 1865.  The prospectus of the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Company Limited (29 July 1864) stated that the establishment of a 
Mint in Hong Kong could provide an adequate supply of the proper currency (King 
and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 1987, 73).  The bank could also 
became the exclusive medium for the transaction of monetary operations connected 
with trade and replace the Compradoric system6 (Collis, 1965).  A locally-based bank 
could therefore offer the benefit of retaining profits within the local economy rather 
than remitting them back to Britain, and could also act as an issuer of bank notes.  
Sutherland’s claim would have had particular significance, creating an aura of 
solidity, prudence and scrupulous attention to business.   
 
The provisional committee was formed comprising 15 members, including Sir 
Thomas Sutherland and all the leading firms in Hong Kong except Jardine and 
Matheson.  The composition of the committee reflected the international nature of the 
merchants of the Treaty Ports.  It included British, American, German, Danish, Jewish 
and Indian members.  Most of them belonged to the firms established originally in 
Hong Kong (King and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1987).  
However, no local Chinese participated in the formation of the bank.  It may due to 
cultural differences and language barriers (Cheng, 1969).   
 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank followed the influence of the Scottish practice 
of cash credit, a forerunner of the modern overdraft, where advances were given to 
their customers. In accordance with these principles, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank 
recorded such advances in “Discount, Loans, & Credits” account in its Statement of 
Liabilities and Assets from its foundation in 1865.  A Scottish banking practice was 
also to set up a branch system, which Hongkong and Shanghai Bank adopted in its 
establishment of branches in both Hong Kong and Shanghai.  This branch system 
facilitated the collection of the repayments of the Foochow loan, with a branch 
located in China. 
 
The United Kingdom convention was to conduct all foreign business using a 
mutually accepted medium of exchange between the parties.  The bank’s convention 
was to record the Foochow loan in British pounds in the financial statements.  With 
respect to the receipt of interest payments by the bank, these were also managed 
according to Scottish convention.  The terms of the contract were that payments were 
to be made each month, which the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank interpreted to be a 
calendar month.  The Banking convention of the west was stringent about repayment 
schedules and amounts.  Failure to comply would indicate financial distress by the 
debtor.  Hongkong and Shanghai Bank’s receipt of some of the Foochow loan late, 
although not very often would have been frowned upon.  
  
                                                 
5 The Scottish banking principles will be discussed later. 
6 Compradors were acted as financial intermediaries who worked with the local bank, remittance, 
merchants and officials, operating especially between the bank and their Chinese counterparts.  
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The British Banking system of the nineteenth century concentrated chiefly on 
the provision of short-term loans for the purposes of working capital rather than long-
term loans for fixed capital investment (Boyns et al., 1997, 53).  Loans and credit 
were mainly financed by deposits, and secured through lending against shares.  Loans 
were usually made not for capital infrastructure, but for short term operating liquidity.  
This also was the general practice of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, and it was a 
legitimate banking practice under the General Companies Ordinance (King and 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 1987).    
 
The banks’ issuing of the bonds had the consequence of transferring the risk 
away from the shareholders of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to those investing in the 
bonds, and in doing so protecting its shareholders’ profits. This is consistent with the 
proprietorship concept of the era.  (Chatfield and Vangermeerch, 1996; Godfrey et al., 
2000).  
 
At this time the United Kingdom was developing principles of revenue 
recognition and revenue realisation through the British common law system. (Glover 
1910).  The upfront reporting of a profit of HK$125,000 did not contravene any 
formal compliance.  It did breach the Scottish principle of conservatism.    
 
 
5.2 Hongkong and Shanghai Bank’s British Colonial Hong Kong Identity 
 
Banks operating overseas retained the traditions of British overseas banks, 
traditions similar to those of Royally chartered banks, while maintaining vital regional 
associations.  Hong Kong was a British colony and did not have significant banking 
laws until the late 1960s.  Hongkong and Shanghai Bank was no different to other 
British banks operating overseas, being subjected through the provisions of the 
Colonial Banking Regulations to authorized regulatory supervision administered by 
the Governor of Hong Kong after consultation with or instructions from the Treasury 
through the Colonial Office (King, 1983). Although there was no specific banking law 
to govern the bank, it still had to comply with the Joint Stock Companies Acts of 1844 
and 1856, and their financial reporting requirements.  In these respects, the Hongkong 
and Shanghai Bank acted as an interface between the financial systems of the east and 
the west, and it is in this capacity that the Foochow loan arose.  
 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in negotiating this loan contract were from an 
institutional and regulatory perspective aligned with the British legislation and 
convention.  It was operating from the British concept of proprietorship, where 
reporting was done from the perspective of the owners, not the entity.  This meant 
“control” i.e. management of the risk of the contract was afforded the investor through 
the regulations and principle of limited liability.  In the writing of the contract an 
image of financial stewardship was conveyed, and at the same time constructed 
around the rights and responsibilities in the social contract of the legislation.  An 
image of stability and probity is verified through the self imposition by Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank of controls such as audits, annual reports and shareholder meetings.   
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However, despite this artefact of colonisation, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank 
was also encumbered by the cultural concept of “Guanxi”7, requiring their image to be 
modified to accommodate a local identity.  An example of this concerns the 
contractual requirement for monthly repayments of the loan. The Chinese did not 
work on a western calendar month, but rather operated by a lunar month.  In the 
negotiations of the loan, while the condition monthly was inserted into the written 
contract, there was verbal acceptance that the payments were to be made in China to 
the Shanghai branch by lunar month (Collis 1965, King 1983, King and Hongkong 
and Shanghai Bank 1987).  This arrangement, while fulfilling the local cultural norm, 
was highly irregular in terms of Scottish banking, and this information was never 
conveyed to London (as indicated by the matter never being raised by the 
stockholders in their annual general meetings).  The concern of a few late payments 
inherent in United Kingdom conventions were not an issue for the bank’s Chinese 
persona.  The bank understood the physical and cultural context of the loan execution.  
The Chinese collected customs duties from vessels in arriving in their ports in the 
form of silver.  The silver was used to repay the loan.  This required relying on 
shipping and trading schedules and transporting the silver from two major ports, 
Foochow and Shanghai to Hong Kong.  This required negotiating bad weather and 
long distances.  The “Customs of Maritime” also delayed the payment process, as they 
first collected and sorted the silver received to its various destinations. 
 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank had to cultivate two images.  In dealing with 
the Emperor and his government, the relationship had to be more than a commercial 
one, operating on a basis of trust.  The Emperor and his government, not having 
concepts of limited liability and a legal person, understood the transaction as a 
relationship with Li Hung-chang and James Grieg who were a local part of Shanghai 
and Hong Kong.  In this capacity, the bank was an agent of the Emperor and in 
honouring this relationship it would do nothing in violation of this trust. This meant 
that it would have been a cultural offence for the bank to request collateral for the 
loan from the Emperor.  Their role of agent to sell the bonds on behalf of the Emperor 
protected the public image of the Emperor.   
 
In the conduct of the bond issue, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank was projecting 
alternate images to the east and the west, while acting with duplicity as protectors to 
both parties.  From the Western viewpoint their strategy removed risk of the loan from 
shareholders to the local investors in the bonds.  From an Eastern perspective, they 
protected the pride of the Emperor, as they were issued in Hongkong and Shanghai 
Bank’s name and did not give a public perception of the Emperor needing money.   It 
removed the Emperor and Chinese government from appearing to beg the public for 
financial support, as would be the case in a government bond issue.  Indeed, as this 
was the first loan, this problem of east and west cultural collision had not been 
encountered before in business.  
 
The bank nurtured its construction of being a local bank in its policy of 
retaining a significant percentage of its shares on the Eastern registers.  In the field in 
                                                 
7 Guānxi describes the dynamic in the nature of personalized networks of social relationships in the 
Chinese society. It also used to describe a network of contacts, which an individual can exert influence 




executing the early advance of  part of the loan, and contracting the loan six months 
prior to the issue of the bonds, Hongkong and Shanghai Bank had to compromise 
sound British business practice to maintain “Guanxi” with the Chinese government.   
 
The juxtaposition inherent in the bank’s position is evident through the 
recognition of the upfront profit of $125,000 on the loan.  It was not until the 
Companies Act of 1929 that it was required that a profit and loss account be laid 
before the company at a general meeting (Hein, 1978). The bank recorded estimated 
profits of the loan to the Profit and Loss in 1874 in order to pay out a dividend for the 
year and project a sound image of its financial position.  From the Chinese 
perspective, the trust concept required no accountability and so none was required by 
the Emperor. However, curiously it must have had some significance to the local 
business community in Hong Kong. The cartoon published in 1875 in China Punch 
magazine [see Figure 1] showed the character Father Time (representing the timing of 
the accounting transaction) emerging from the gloom of 1874 bringing in the new 
year, a bag of silver dollars with legs and clearly marked “1875 loan”…£675,645” 
(King and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1987) is Western in 
appearance, bringing the profits of 1875 to Hongkong and Shanghai Bank’s 
representative (dressed in Chinese government uniform only allowed to be worn by 
official representatives of the Emperor) in 1874.    This cartoon, published in an 
English language magazine, both expresses the accountability concerns of the 
predominately western shareholders and at the same time also confirms the identity of 
HSBC as being perceived as truly local to China. 
 
Take in Figure 2 
 
The Chairman explained the timing of the revenue recognition at the General 
Meeting was due to the poor performance of the half-year’s result, and without the 
China Loan, there would be no profit available.  This result can be seen from Table I.  
The directors explained the situation from the proprietary viewpoint, that is, regarding 
the assets and liability as those of the proprietor, with the potential use of the net 
worth unrestricted (Godfrey et al., 2000).   
 
Take in Table 1 
 
The shareholders did not raise a point of significance at the annual meetings 
until 1875 because of their trust in the bank.  They even criticized the directors for 
knowing the problems and withholding information.  The directors defended 
themselves saying that the Chairman had informed the shareholders in a general way 
and raised the question of the auditors’ inability to detect the unauthorized 
investments.   
 
The bank was aware of these and other criticisms and sought to correct the 
impression at every opportunity.  The bank’s response was to present itself to the west 
as a financially reliable bank. As a result, a London Committee was set up to examine 
and inspect all the bill schedules and the problem of lending on the ultimate security 
of Bank shares.  An internal inspection system was set up beyond the scrutiny of 
managers. Although no provisions were made at that time for auditing the accounts on 
which the statements were based, nor of the statements themselves, all the bank’s 
accounts were to be audited under the terms of the British ordinance.  The quick 
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response of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank was to present itself as a financially 




The reason Hongkong and Shanghai bank succeeded in the loan was due to the 
connections and reputation of the bank (Jones, 1993), since its issue was a matter of 
confidence.  With the founder’s and its manager’s personal experience of China and 
specialist knowledge of Chinese conditions, the bank was willing to accommodate the 
requirements of the Chinese Emperor.  These requirements included a floating loan on 
its own terms, denominated in Chinese units of account (taels), with interest 
calculated on a lunar-month basis and payments at different intervals, which was 
different from the western loan calculation.  With the connection of the British and 
Hong Kong Government, the bank was able to place the China loans on the London 
market without the help of other merchant banks.   
 
Throughout this transaction it was necessary for the bank to project dual 
identities, beyond what it would do in the normal course of communicating with 
investors and clients in a mono-cultural setting.  The duality of identity was necessary 
to make the loan. An analysis of this event questions the ability of accounting 
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HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING COMPANY, LIMITED. 
 
Report of the Court of Directors 
 
General Meeting of Shareholders, 
TO BE HELD AT THE BANKING HOUSE OF THE COMPANY, 
WARDLEY HOUSE, 
HONG KONG, 
On Monday, the 12
th
 of February, 1866. 
 
To the Participator of the  
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Co., Limited. 
 
GENTLEMEN – In accordance with the terms of the Deed of Settlement the Directors have 
now to submit to you their First annual Report on the Positions of the Company’s affairs. 
The first call of $25 per Share was made on the first of January 1865, and the Second call of 
$100 was due on the 31st of March; three payments were made with great promptness. 
The Company’s Offices at Hongkong & Shanghai were opened for the transaction of business 
in the month of April last, but were not in fair working order until the middle of May.  The operations 
of the Bank to the 31st December have therefore extended over a period of less than eight months. 
 
The following is the statement of accounts, which have been duly audited by the Honourable W.H. 
Rennie and Calab T. Smith, Esq. 
 
Abstract Statement of Liabilities and Assets of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Company Limited, 
on  the 31
st
 December, 1865 
 LIABILITIES.    ASSETS.  
Paid up Capital (3125 on 20,000 shares) $2,500,000.00 Cash Balances on hand and at Bankers $1,250,388.78 
Deposits and Notes in circulations 3,384,876.62 Discounts, Loans, credits, &c., 3,144,446.75 
Exchange acceptances, &c   5,731,434.62 Exchange Remittances, &c., 5,554,279.13 
Branches and Agencies  1,548,219.18 Branches and Agencies, 3,393,430.75 
Profit and Loss Account  225,055.93 Preliminary Expenses, 32,827.62 
Sundries   7,069.07 Sundries  21,322.39 
                                                 Total $13,396,655.42   $13,396,655.42 
       
       
   PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT.  
To Dividend at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, 
or $6.66 per share 
 $133,200.00 
By amount of Profit for the Eight months 
ended 31st December 1865, after   
Amount carried to Reserve Fund 33,300.00 
deducting all expense and interest paid 
and due $225,055.93 
Amount written off Preliminary Expenses, Bonus 
to constituents and Depositors, &c.  14,577.97   
Rebate on Bills not due  31,696.66    
Balance being undivided profits carried forward 
to next half year  12,261.00    
   225,055.93    
 
We have examined and audited the above accounts and find them correct. 
 
        (signed)   W.H. RENNIE, 
                                                            C.T. SMITH, 






Figure 2 China Punch New Year’s cartoon 
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TABLE 1 
Assets and liabilities, 1867 – 1874 
(in millions of HK dollars) 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 
Assets              
Cash on hand and with 
banks 1.25 1.94 3.95 4.23 4.25 10.18 9.35 8.1 11.26 8.55 4.36 4.45 5.72 
Discounts, loans, credits 3.14 4.07 3.37 4.38 4.76 8.11 7.65 11.03 9.84 9.76 9.25 8.67 10.34 
Exchange remittances 5.55 9.20 13.29 12 17.98 16.67 21.31 32.22 26.95 21.87 18.15 28.92 34.01 
Branches and agencies 3.39             
Preliminary expenses 0.03 0.02            
Government securities   0.24 0.72 0.94 2.95 2.04 2.16 2.82 2.48 2.55 0.93 23.4 
Other   0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.26 0.32    
Buildings  0.06         0.23 0.22 0.21 
Dead stock 0.01 0.03                 0.09 0.1 0.1 
Total Assets = liabilities 13.37 15.32 20.96 21.45 28.07 38.05 40.5 53.67 51.14 42.91 34.63 43.29 52.71 
              
Liabilities              
Paid-up capital 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
+ Paid up (new shares)  0.39 0.5 0.5 1 1.5 2       
+Marine Insurance 
Account          0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 
+ Reserve Fund   0.1 0.25 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.65 
= Shareholders' funds 2.5 2.99 3.25 3.5 4.2 1.8 5.4 6 6 5.13 5.15 5.27 5.72 
Deposits and notes  3.38 4.13 6.28 7.06 7.81 11.11 12.58 16.07 18.77 19.8 13.41 13.07 22.36 
          of which :banknotes 0.8 0.93 1.22 1.11 1.76 1.71 1.52 2.37 1.96 2.24 1.88 1.31 2.04 
Exchange acceptances 5.73 7.86 11.04 10.42 15.68 21.67 22.12 31.26 26.13 17.86 15.74 24.44 24.08 
Branches and agencies 1.55             
Profit and loss   0.39 0.46 0.37 0.46 0.4 0.34 0.24 0.12 0.34 0.5 0.55 
Profit and Loss 
(in thousands of dollars)       
By amount from Reserve 
Fund 675    
By balance of undivided 
profits 0 45.7 14.2 70.7 116.8 99.4 31.3 122.8 36.8 7 106 38.1 14 
By amount of profits 193.4 278.3 368.1 382.6 249.5 361.7 367 206.4 199.7 112.7 228.1 460.7 535 
=Total funds to be 
allocated 193.4 324 382.3 453.2 366.3 461.1 398.3 329.2 236.3 794.8 334.1 498.8 549 
To preliminary expenses 6.4 5 10   268.6        
To bonus to customers 8.2             
To Contingency Fund          781 145   
To dividend 132.2 180 180 180 210 160 270 300 200 0 150 177.78 177.78 
To directors' remuneration  28 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10.7 20 10 10 
To reserves 33.3 75 125 200 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 300 350 
To balance carried forward 12.3 35.9 57.3 63.2 46.3 22.6 18.3 19.2 26.3 3.1 19.1 11 11.2 
Reserve Fund: new 















Summary of The Hongkong Bank’s Ordinance of Incorporation 
 
No. 5 of 1866 
 
An Ordinance enacted by the Governor of Hongkong, with the Advice of the 
Legislative council thereof, for the Incorporation of the Hongkong and Shanghae 
Banking Company. 
 
[14th August, 1866] 
 
I. This Ordinance may be cited for all purposes as “The Hongkong and 
Shanghae Bank Ordinance.” 
II. The expression “The Governor” shall mean His Excellency the Governor 
of the colony of Hongkong.  “the Company” shall mean “The Hongkong 
and Shanghae Banking Corporation”.  “The colony” shall mean the Colony 
of Hongkong and its Dependencies. 
III. The proprietors shall be one body politic and corporate by the name of 
Hongkong and Shanghae Banking Corporation which may be sued. 
IV. The company is established for the purpose of carrying on under the 
management of a Court of Directors. 
V. The capital of the company shall consist of five millions of dollars divided 
into forty thousand shares of one hundred and twenty-five dollars. 
VI. The paid up capital should be published in the Hong Kong Government 
Gazette. 
VII. Unless the whole capital has been subscribed, the Governor could cease 
the grant of incorporation. 
VIII. The company could not be entitled to hold out to the public that the 
amount of its capital has been increased until the notification was provided 
by the governor. 
IX. The reminder of the instalments on the shares shall be made to appear to 
the satisfaction of the Governor to be evidenced. 
X. The Deed of Settlement shall be contained provisions for: 
a. Holding general meetings at least once a year 
b. Holding extraordinary general meetings upon the requisition of 9 or 
more shareholders. 
c. For the management of the affairs of the company and the election and 
qualifications of the directors 
d. For the retirement of at least one-fourth of the directors of the company 
yearly 
e. For the yearly audit of the accounts of the company by two or more 
auditors, not being directors at the time. 
f. For the yearly communication of the auditors’ report, and of a balance 
sheet, and profit and loss accounts to every shareholder. 
XI. The provision of this ordinance shall be taken to be the existing rules and 
regulations of the company. 
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XII. Note issue: It shall be lawful for the company to issue notes or bills 
payable to bearer on demand in coin current in the colony. 
XIII. The total amount of the bills of the company payable to bearer on demand 
shall not exceed the amount of the capital of the company paid up. 
XIV. The total amount of the debts and liabilities of the company shall not 
exceed the aggregate amount of the existing bona fide assets of the 
company. 
XV. Suspension of payment shall not be lawful to make any fresh issue of notes 
or bills. 
XVI. Directors shall not be allowed to obtain credit on his own personal 
guarantee. 
XVII. It shall be lawful for the company to purchase or sale property. 
XVIII. The company shall be authorized to grant, sell alien and convey in 
mortmain unto the company and their successors. 
XIX. It is illegal for the company to make any purchase of messuages and lands 
beyond the annual value of thirty thousand dollars. 
XX. The company is not allow to  invest, lay out, and advance any part of their 
capital or funds in the purchase of any lands or property  
XXI. The company can sell any lands and property for cash and merchandize. 
XXII. The company is legal to extend or increase their capital with the consent of 
a general meeting of the shareholders. 
XXIII. The reminder of the instalments on the shares to be certified by the 
governor. 
XXIV. The directors of the company shall be required to submit accounts and 
statements requested by the Governor. 
XXV. If the company become insolvent, every proprietor will be liable to 
contribute to the payments of the debts. 
XXVI. The deeds to be executed due provision shall accordingly be made for the 
payment by the shareholders. 
XXVII. In the events of insolvency, the ordinance shall cease and become void. 
XXVIII. The company may be wound up by the Supreme Court of Hong Kong. 
XXIX.  On the determination for the term of 21 years from the date of this 
ordnance the powers and privileges conferred on the company shall cease, 
unless the governor declare to authorize the company to continue 
incorporated. 
XXX. The company shall not affect or prejudice the liability for the company to 
have enforced against its any debt or obligation incurred by the company. 
